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It is not yet known whether attention and consciousness operate through similar or largely different mechanisms. Visual processing
mechanisms are routinely characterizedbymeasuring contrast response functions (CRFs). In this report, behavioral CRFswere obtained
in humans (both males and females) by measuring afterimage durations over the entire range of inducer stimulus contrasts to reveal
visualmechanismsbehindattentionandconsciousness.Deviations relative to the standardCRF, i.e., gain functions, describe the strength
of signal enhancement, which were assessed for both changes due to attentional task and conscious perception. It was found that
attention displayed a response-gain function, whereas consciousness displayed a contrast-gain function. Through model comparisons,
which only included contrast-gainmodulations, both contrast-gain and response-gain effects can be explainedwith a two-level normalization
model, inwhichconsciousnessaffectsonly the first levelandattentionaffectsonly thesecondlevel.Theseresultsdemonstrate thatattentionand
consciousness can effectively showdifferent gain functions because they operate through different signal enhancementmechanisms.
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Introduction
Attention and consciousness are both major cognitive functions
that determine visual processing. The relationship between atten-
tion and consciousness and their effects on our visual perception
have been strongly debated (Wundt, 1874; Iwasaki, 1993; Posner,
1994; Chun and Wolfe, 2000; Dehaene et al., 2006; Koch and
Tsuchiya, 2007; Mole, 2008; De Brigard and Prinz, 2010; van
Boxtel et al., 2010a; Cohen et al., 2012; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2012;
Prinz, 2012). A commonly held belief is that a tight link exists
between attention and consciousness (Dehaene et al., 2006; De
Brigard and Prinz, 2010; Cohen et al., 2012; Prinz, 2012). How-
ever, other researchers believe that attention and consciousness can
be separated experimentally (Kentridge et al., 2004; Wyart and
Tallon-Baudry, 2008; Brascamp et al., 2010; van Boxtel et al., 2010b;
Watanabeet al., 2011). It shouldbenoted that “attention”here refers
to endogenous directed focal attention, not, for example, exogenous
attention, and “consciousness” refers to perception as gauged by
reported visibility andmanipulated throughmasking.
Evidence that attention and consciousness are separable would
find the strongest support from a double dissociation between these
two functions (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; van Boxtel et al., 2010a;
Cohen et al., 2012); that is, when the effects of attention and
consciousness go in opposite directions. A rare behavioral exam-
ple of such a double dissociation comes from a psychophysical
paradigm that investigated how afterimage durations are affected
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Significance Statement
The relationship between attention and consciousness is still debated. Mapping contrast response functions (CRFs) has allowed
(neuro)scientists to gain important insights into the mechanistic underpinnings of visual processing. Here, the influence of both
attention and consciousness on these functions were measured and they displayed a strong dissociation. First, attention lowered
CRFs, whereas consciousness raised them. Second, attentionmanifests itself as a response-gain function, whereas consciousness
manifests itself as a contrast-gain function. Extensivemodel comparisons show that these results are best explained in a two-level
normalization model in which consciousness affects only the first level, whereas attention affects only the second level. These
findings showdissociations betweenboth the computationalmechanismsbehind attention and consciousness and the perceptual
consequences that they induce.
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by attention and consciousness (van Boxtel et al., 2010b). It was
shown that consciousness increased afterimage durations, whereas
attention decreased afterimage durations.
Although this previous research shows strong support for a
dissociation between attention and consciousness, it does not pro-
vide insight into how this dissociation comes about. To gain such
mechanistic understanding, researchers often map out contrast
response functions (CRFs) (Albrecht and Hamilton, 1982; Reyn-
olds and Heeger, 2009; Carrasco, 2011). Therefore, to determine
whether the effects of attention and consciousness are subserved
by similar or different mechanisms, afterimage durations were
measured over a range of contrasts to determine behavioral CRFs
and investigate themodulations of this curve caused by attention
and consciousness.
CRFs of neuronal responses (Albrecht and Hamilton, 1982),
as well as behavioral performance (Carrasco, 2011), generally
increase in a sigmoidal fashion with increasing stimulus contrast
(see Fig. 1A). Attention generally enhances contrast responses,
but it can do so in different ways (Reynolds and Heeger, 2009; Car-
rasco, 2011). For example, attention can shift the contrast response
curve to the left, thereby effectively boosting stimulus contrast
(Reynolds and Heeger, 2009; Carrasco, 2011). This response mod-
ulation is called a contrast gain function and shows the largest
effects at intermediate contrasts (Fig. 1A,B). Attention has also
been reported to modulate responses multiplicatively. This type
of function is called a response gain function, which shows the
largest effects at high contrasts (Fig. 1A,B). The influence of
consciousness on CRFs is not yet known, although one of the
techniques to modulate conscious perception, interocular sup-
pression, often, but not always, produces contrast gain functions
(Sengpiel et al., 1998; Watanabe et al., 2004; Li et al., 2005; Bah-
rami et al., 2008; Yuval-Greenberg and Heeger, 2013).
Importantly, no study has measured and controlled for the
effects of both attention and consciousness on CRFs. It is there-
fore possible that the previously reported effects in CRFs are a
mixture of both attention and consciousness. Here, a technique is
used that strictly controlled both attention and consciousness
modulations, allowing the study of their separate effects onCRFs.
Gain functions for both attention and consciousness were thus in-
dependently determined to study whether they operate through the
same or distinct signal enhancement mechanisms.
Materials andMethods
Experimental design and statistical analysis
The same stimuli and paradigm were used as described previously (van
Boxtel et al., 2010b).
Participants
Low spatial frequency (SF).Data were obtained from 17 individuals (nine
male/eight female college students). Based on trial inclusion criteria (see
below), two participants were excluded because they hadmissing data in
more than two parameter combinations. Therefore, the data from 15
individuals (eight males) were analyzed further.
High SF. Nineteen participants participated. Three participants were
excluded because of missing data. Therefore, data from 16 individuals
(6 male, 10 female, mean age 20 years/1 month, SD 1 year/4 months)
were analyzed further.
Stimuli
The afterimage inducer was aGabor patchwith a contrast that was drawn
from 0.03, 0.06, 0.125, 0.25, 0.50, and 1. The patch was Gaussian win-
dowed ( 1.43°) and had an SF of 0.23 cycles/° or 3 cycles/°, a random
orientation, and was presented at 4.9° eccentricity. The mask, which was
shown on half of the trials, was of 100% contrast rotated at 120°/s and
consisted of a Gaussian windowed (  1.43°) checkerboard (0.78 cycles/°).
It reversed contrast every 67ms. Presentation location of the inducer and
themaskwas shifted by 45° counterclockwise between trials. Background
luminance was 49 cd/m2. All experiments were performed on a gamma-
corrected monitor.
In the low-attention conditions, the attentional task was a rapid serial
visual presentation (RSVP) of red letters (fontHelvetica, 12 point). These
letters were shown for 133 ms, after which they were immediately re-
placed by the next letter.
Procedure
Each trial had three phases. The first phase was the adaptation phase
during which the afterimage inducer was shown in one eye (left and right
eye presentation was counterbalanced over trials). To the other eye, the
mask was shown in invisible trials, whereas nomask was shown in visible
trials. The adaptation phase lasted 4 s. To create conditions inwhich a low
amount of attention was paid to the inducer, subjects were distracted by
a RSVP in which they counted the number of X’s (n 2–5; participants
were told there could be 1–5 in any trial) that appeared in an RSVP
streamof nontarget letters (randomly chosen from:M, S, T, A, B, C,D,O,
K, P, Y). Subjects did not report visibility in the low-attention trials,
avoiding the need to deploy attention to the inducer. In the high-
attention trials, the RSVP task was not performed but the letters were
shown. Instead, subjects tracked the subjective visibility of the inducer by
pressing and releasing a keyboard button.
The second phase was the afterimage phase. Participants pressed a
button as soon as they perceived an afterimage and released the button
when the afterimage disappeared. Because afterimages in this experiment
were perceived instantaneously, afterimage duration was recorded from
the start of the afterimage phase until the button was released. Partici-
pants pressed the space bar if no afterimage was perceived (this was
recorded as a 0 s afterimage duration).
In the third phase, the observer was asked to indicate the number of
X’s that were counted. The number was indicated with the keypad. In the
high-attention condition, this questionwas skipped by pressing the space
bar. All trials were presented in a pseudorandom order and divided over
eight blocks separated by brief rest periods.
Data analysis
For the data analysis, trials were excluded when the reported number of
X’s was off by1 (except where noted differently). For the trials with the
mask, which should lead to invisibility of the inducer stimulus, trials that
were nonetheless reported as visible for any length of time (i.e., they
broke through suppression)were excluded. These selection criteria led to
the inclusion of the following number of trials (mean  SEM over
participants): in the low SF condition: 47.53  0.47 (Visible–High At-
tention), 35.53 1.40 (Visible–LowAttention), 41.93 2.63 (Invisible–
HighAttention), 36.87 0.97 (Invisible–LowAttention); and in the high
SF condition: 47.58  0.34 (Visible–High Attention), 32.74  1.76
(Visible–Low Attention), 28.16  3.65 (Invisible–High Attention),
32.79  2.16 (Invisible–Low Attention). The lowest mean number of
trials of any of the contrast conditions was as follows: 5.67 0.33 (Visi-
ble–Low Attention, contrast 0.06) for the low SF condition and 4.0
0.68 (Invisible–LowAttention, contrast 0.5) for the high SF condition.
Calculating psychophysical gain functions
The afterimage durations in the condition with invisible trials that were
not attended (Att/Vis) were taken as a baseline measure, as this con-
dition has a maximally reduced influence of attention and conscious
visibility in our design. The attention-induced gain function was then
calculated by subtracting, per participant, this baseline from the at-
tended, but invisible conditions (Att/Vis): AI  Att/Vis 
Att/Vis. The visibility-induced gain function was similarly calculated
by subtracting Att/Vis from the visible but less-attended condition:
AIAtt/VisAtt/Vis.AI-measures were averaged over par-
ticipants, and calculated per contrast value.
Contrast-gain index (CGI) and response gain index (RGI)
CGI and RGI were calculated per individual. The CGI was calculated as
the difference between the average response at the middle two contrasts
minus the average response at the lowest and highest contrast, as follows:
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0.5 ((AI0.13 AI0.25) (AI0.03 AI1)), where AIc refers to
AI at contrast c. The RGI was calculated as the average response at the
highest two contrasts minus the average response at the lowest two con-
trasts. It was then multiplied by 1 to yield a positive index, as follows:
 0.5  AI0.50AI1)(AI0.03AI0.06)). Two subjects missed
data for some of theAIc values; these participants were removed for this
analysis. CGI and RGI values were analyzed with one-sample t tests ver-
sus 0. Comparisons between experiments for both CGI and RGI were
made using two-tailed paired t tests.
Z-transformed partial correlations and descriptive model fitting
Both the attention and visibility AI data were fit with predictions from
a contrast gain and response gainmodel. For the contrast gainmodel, the
contrast-response curve change is characterized by a shift to the left or
right. For a response gain model, the change is characterized by a multi-
plicative increase in response. Therefore, using the NonLinearModel
class in MATLAB (2014b, 2015b) with default parameters, the average
AI data were fitted with the following functions:
Contrast gain model :
Rmax  C
n
Cn  C50
n 
Rmax  C
n
Cn  C50
n (1)
Response gain model :
  Rmax  C
n
Cn  C50
n (2)
WhereRmax is themaximumobtainable response,C is the contrast of the
inducer, n is an exponent that determines the steepness of the curve, and
C50 is the contrast at which half-maximum response is reached. The
parameter  is the gain of the process under scrutiny; that is, attention or
visibility. For both high and low SF experiments, we fixed all parameters,
except . Rmax was set to 150% of the maximum AI duration at 100%
contrast, C50 to 0.25, and the exponent n was set to 2 (Herrmann et al.,
2010).
To remove correlations between the contrast gain and response gain
models themselves, partial correlations were computed (Movshon et al.,
1985; Smith et al., 2005). The partial correlations for contrast-gain (Rc)
and response-gain (Rr) models are as follows:
Rc 
rc  rcrcr
1  rc2	1  rcr2 	
(3)
and
Rr 
rr  rrrcr
1  rr2	1  rcr2 	
(4)
where rc and rr are the correlations between the AI data and the
contrast-gain and response-gain models, respectively, and rcr is the cor-
relation between the two fitted gain models.
Pearson’s r correlations are not normally distributed, so the Fisher
r-to-Z transformation (shown just for Rc) was used as follows:
Zc 
0.5
1  Rc	
1  Rc	
1df
(5)
where df is the degrees of freedom, which is equal to the number of
contrast values measured minus 3. A Z larger than 1.65 (equal to p 
0.05, one-tailed) was taken as the threshold for significance.
Model fitting
Several models were considered as potentially being able to explain our
data. The models that were considered had a very similar two-level
architecture, with a level 1 (L1) activity feeding into a L2. Both levels
represent the neural activity of that level, with L1 representing a contrast-
polarity sensitive level and L2 representing a contrast-polarity-insensitive
level. Both levels include adaptation. The layout of all models was as
follows:
RespL1(C) FL1 (6)
RespL2(C) FL2 (7)
Sp  1  m  RespL2RespL1	 (8)
RespAdapt s Sp  RespL2RespL1	 O (9)
where RespL1 is the response at L1; RespL2 is the response at L2 and takes
the output of L1 as input; FL1 and FL2 describe the contrast-response
functions of L1 and L2, which are explained below for each of the models
separately; and Sp describes the sensitivity postadaptation at L2, which is
dependent on the preadaptation activity of this level. The parameter m
determines the strength of adaptation at L2. Note that a stronger adapta-
tion at the second level lowers the sensitivity Sp which is analogous to
increasing the contrast detection threshold (cf. Brascamp et al., 2010).
The final response of the model is RespAdapt, which is scaled (with s) and
offset (with O) to best fit the data. It was assumed that the afterimage
duration is directly related to this final response (i.e., a larger response
means a longer time to decay).
Note that the activity inL1 is alsodependentonadaptation, but this is only
implicitly present in the model. Specifically, it was assumed that there exist
two populations of neurons at L1, a population L1
 that is responding to the
presented contrast polarity of the inducer and a population L1
 that is not.
Without adaptation, the responses of both populations in L1 would lead to
anunbiased response to a gray screen:L1
L1
 0.However, adaptation at
L1 leads to a decreased sensitivity for cells in L1
, but not in cells that are
nonresponsive to the stimulus (L1
).Therefore, after adaptation, there isnow
a biased response (L1
 L1
 RespL1 0), causing the afterimage.
Models were fitted using the fmincon function inMATLAB. Themod-
els were simultaneously fit to the four contrast-response functions, as
well as to the two AI curves (the consciousness and attention gain
functions). Both upper and lower bounds were provided on all parame-
ters. Lower and upper bounds for the various parameters were as follows:
n [lower  0, upper  3], C50 [0, 1], m [0, 1], s [0, 100], O [0, 2]. The
various multiplicative attention terms (A) were bounded as follows
[1, 100], with 1 being no attentional effect. When the parameter Ccfs was
free to vary, it was limited to [0, 1].
In all models except the full model, Ccfs was set to 0 when no CFS
stimulus was presented and 1 when a CFS stimulus was presented. In the
full model, Ccfs was a free parameter when the CFS stimulus was pre-
sented (independently at L1 and at L2). In all models, multiplicative
attention (A) parameters were set to 1 in low-attention conditions and
were free to vary in the high-attention condition.
Contrast-response functions for the different models
Monocular normalization only model. The monocular normalization-
only model was the base model against which other models were com-
pared. This model consists of two stages, each with a normalization
operation butwithout attention and consciousnessmanipulation. Figure
4B shows the model layout. The CRFs, which include the normalization
step, for L1 and L2 are as follows:
FL1 C
n/Cn  C50
n 	 (10)
FL2 C
n/Cn  C50
n 	 (11)
This model has five free parameters: n, C50,m, s, andO. Parametersm, s,
and O are as explained above. The parameter n controls the steepness of
the tuning curves and it is the same for L1 and L2. C50 determines the
point where the tuning curve reaches half the maximum height; it is also
the same for L1 and L2. The parameters n, C50, s, m, and O are free
parameters in all models.
Attention-first model. The attention-first (and consciousness second)
model includes the influence of attention at L1 and the influence of the
CFS stimulus at L2 (see model architecture in Fig. 4B). The CRFs for L1
and L2 are as follows:
FL1 A1C
n/A1C
n  C50
n 	 (12)
FL2 C
n/Cn  CCFS
n  C50
n 	 (13)
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where A1 is the multiplicative influence of attention at L1 and CCFS is the
contrast of the CFS stimulus (set to 0 when the CFS stimulus was absent
and to 1 when the CFS stimulus was present).
Consciousness-first model. The consciousness-first (and attention sec-
ond) model includes the influence of CFS at L1 and the influence of
attention at L2 (seemodel architecture in Fig. 4B). TheCRFs for L1 and L2
are as follows:
FL1 C
n/Cn  CCFS
n  C50
n 	 (14)
FL2 A2C
n/A2C
n  C50
n 	 (15)
where A2 is the multiplicative influence of attention at L2.
Attention-first model with response gain for attention. In this model, the
CRFs for L1 and L2 are identical to the attention-first model apart from
excluding the attentional effects in the denominator (thus resulting in an
attention-induced response-gain) as follows:
FL1 A1C
n/Cn  C50
n 	 (16)
FL2 C
n/Cn  CCFS
n  C50
n 	 (17)
Parameter definitions are as in the attention-first model.
Consciousness-firstmodel with response gain for attention. In thismodel,
theCRFs forL1 andL2 are identical to the consciousness-firstmodel apart
from excluding the attentional effects in the denominator (thus resulting
in an attention-induced response-gain) as follows:
FL1 C
n/Cn  CCFS
n  C50
n 	 (18)
FL2 A2C
n/Cn  C50
n 	 (19)
Parameter definitions are as in the consciousness-first model.
Full model. The full model includes the influence of CFS and attention
at L1 and at L2 (see model architecture in Fig. 4B). Attention is imple-
mented as spatial attention, and therefore boosts both the activity to the
afterimage inducer (C), and the CFS stimulus (CFS). The CRFs for L1
and L2 are as follows:
FL1 A1C
n/A1C
n  A1CCFS1
n  C50
n 	 (20)
FL2 A2C
n/A2C
n  A2CCFS2
n  C50
n 	 (21)
Model comparison
The fits were compared using the Bayesian information criterion (BIC),
in which a low BIC is better (a perfect fit leads to a BIC of
). The BIC
depends on the likelihood, which was calculated as follows:
L  0.5  dfe  N  log2	 logMSE			 (22)
Where L is the likelihood, N is the number of data points, dfe is the
degrees of freedom of the error ( N minus the number of parameters
that are estimated), andMSE equals the sumof squared errors of all the fit
residuals divided by dfe.
As a baseline, we took the monocular normalization-only model (N)
that has only monocular normalization, but no influence of attention and
interocular interactions. Models were compared by calculating the differ-
ence in the BIC score (BIC) relative to themonocular normalization-only
model (N). According to Kass and Raftery (1995), BIC values not worth
more than a baremention are 0 abs(BIC) 2; those that show positive
evidence are 2 abs(BIC) 6; those that show strong evidence are 6
abs(BIC)  10, and those that show very strong evidence are
abs(BIC) 10. Note that theBIC thresholds of 2, 6, and 10 convert to
the Bayes factors (BF10) of 2.7, 20, and 148, respectively. Apart from the
models discussed here, we also considered various other models, which
are not discussed below, but our conclusions remain the same.
Results
Psychophysical data
Wemeasured the complete CRFs under various levels of focused
attention and consciousness (operationalized as visibility) while
using a full-factorial design. This approach allowed us to investi-
gate the independent influences of attention and consciousness
on visual processing (Fig. 1C). Previous research has shown that,
when the influences of attention and consciousness are not
strictly controlled, it may be difficult to attribute experimental
effects to either of these processes (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; van
Boxtel et al., 2010a). Masking is a powerful technique to modu-
late conscious perception (KimandBlake, 2005) and it allows one
to separate the influences of attention from those of conscious-
ness (Dehaene et al., 2006; Kanai et al., 2010; van Boxtel et al.,
2010b). We therefore used the most versatile method to render
stimuli invisible through the process of masking, a method called
continuous flash suppression (CFS) (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005).
We paired the CFS technique with a stringent control of the
participant’s attention allocation.Weminimized attention to the
inducer stimulus in half of the trials by means of a distracting
RSVP task (Rees et al., 1999). On other trials, participants re-
ported the visibility of the inducer stimulus, which resulted in
high levels of attention to the inducer stimulus. By using this
AA A
How many Xs 
did you count?
2 2
4 sec
Until button
release or
spacebar
OR
Contrast
R
es
po
ns
e
Contrast
Δ 
R
es
po
ns
e
CA
B
Contrast response functions
Gain functions
How many Xs 
did you count?
Figure1. A, Schematic illustration of contrast-gain (dark solid curve) and response-gain (light solid curve) effects on a CRF (dashedblack). A contrast gain is evident as awholesale rightward shift
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design, attention and consciousness were independently modu-
lated, resulting in a 2 2matrix that consisted of four conditions:
low-attention/invisible (i.e., Att/Vis), low-attention/visible (i.e.,
Att/Vis), high-attention/invisible (i.e., Att/Vis), and high-at-
tention/visible (i.e., Att/Vis). This design allowedus toderive the
individual contributions of attention and consciousness.
We determined psychometric CRFs, as measured by afterim-
age durations, for all four conditions (Fig. 2A,C). We looked at
the influence of attention and consciousness separately relative to
a baseline condition that lacked both of these influences. There-
fore, to calculate the gain functions for attention and conscious-
ness (Fig. 2B,D), we took the low-attention/invisible condition
(i.e., black dashed lines, Att/Vis, Fig. 2A,C) as a baseline be-
cause this condition lacked influences of both attention and vis-
ibility. The gain function for attention was then calculated as the
difference inAI duration (AI duration) between the high-atten-
tion/invisible condition and this baseline (i.e.,AIAtt/Vis
Att/Vis; Fig. 2B,D, red curve). Similarly, the gain function for
visibility was then calculated as the AI duration between this
baseline and the low-attention/visible condition (i.e., AI 
Att/Vis  Att/Vis; Fig. 2B,D, blue curve).
These results show strikingly different gain functions for atten-
tion and consciousness. Attention decreased afterimage durations
(Fig. 2B,D, red curve), whereas visibility increased afterimage dura-
tions (Fig. 2B,D, blue curve) (Suzuki and Grabowecky, 2003;
Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005; Brascamp et al., 2010; van Boxtel et al.,
2010b). Furthermore, attention follows a response-gain function
with small effects at low inducer contrasts and large significant
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Figure 2. Afterimage durations in the 2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F, Z-transformed correlations between AI duration data and contrast and response gain functions. The shaded area represents significance. The different symbols are data with different
performance thresholds in the RSVP task. Larger dots correspond to stricter RSVP thresholds (and consequently fewer trials); large to small: 1, 2, 3, 4 items off correct. In all cases, the attention curve
is best fit with a response gain function, whereas the visibility curve is best fit with a contrast gain function. Error bars indicate SEM.
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effects at high inducer contrasts (Fig. 2B,D, red stars), whereas
visibility follows a contrast-gain function, with significant effects
only at intermediate inducer contrasts (Fig. 2B,D, blue stars). We
quantified these effects further by calculating for each subject a
CGI and an RGI (seeMaterials andMethods; Fig. 2E). These data
revealed that, over all subjects (and both experiments), attention
had a significant RGI (t(29) 2.92, p 0.007, Cohen’s d 0.53),
butnosignificantCGI(t(29)1.30,p0.20,Cohen’sd0.24).
Conversely, visibility showed a significant CGI (t(29)  2.91, p 
0.007, Cohen’s d 0.53), but no significant RGI (t(29)1.36, p
0.18, Cohen’s d  0.25). Similar findings are obtained for the
low and high SF experiments separately in that there are positive
RGIs for attention (low SF: t(14)  1.7, p  0.10, Cohen’s d 
0.45, ns; high SF: t(13) 5.83, p 0.0001, Cohen’s d 1.56), and
a positive CGI for visibility (low SF: t(14)  2.75, p  0.016,
Cohen’s d 0.71; high SF: t(13) 1.0235, p 0.32, Cohen’s d
0.27, ns), although significance was not always reached. There was
no significant difference between the RGI for attention for the low
and high SF data (t(27) 0.69, p 0.50, Cohen’s d 0.26). There
was a significantdifferencebetween theCGI for attention for the low
and high SF data (t(27) 2.20, p 0.036, Cohen’s d 0.83). Nev-
ertheless, the overall data suggest that attention and consciousness
operate through different gain functions.
Interestingly, we find that attention and consciousness also have
opposite effects at 3 cycles/°, which is inconsistent with a previous
report (Brascamp et al., 2010). That report showed that attention
decreased afterimage durations at low and high SFs, but that the
effect of visibility depended on SF: visibility increased afterimage
duration at low SFs (consistent with our findings), whereas it de-
creased the afterimage durations at higher (3 cycles/°) SFs (inconsis-
tent with our findings). This discrepancy could potentially be
explained by the use of different paradigms (i.e., afterimage nulling
versus duration paradigms). However, an alternative explanation is
related to the fact the previous study did not use a 2 2 design. For
example, the attention effect was only measured in the visible con-
ditions and the visibility effect was measured without having a
demanding secondary task. Therefore, attention was not strictly
controlled for in the measurements of the visibility effect. Without
this task, participantspotentiallypaidmore attention to the stimulus
when it was visible then when it was invisible.
Based on our data, we can estimate the results of this method-
ological difference. To approximate the effects of the previous
study, we looked at the condition that combined the effects of
attention and consciousness. Therefore, we computed the gain
function based on the difference between our standard baseline
condition (i.e., the invisible/low-attention condition, Att/Vis)
and the condition with both high visibility and high attention
(i.e., the visible/high-attention condition): Att/Vis  Att/
Vis. These data are plotted with open circles in Figure 3. We
compared this with the gain function without attention con-
found (open circles in Fig. 3, replotted from Fig. 2).
We found that, at low SFs, the lack of a demanding secondary
task (and the consequent potential for a confounding influence of
attention) has no or little influence of the gain function for visi-
bility. However, at higher frequencies, an increase of attention
(due to poor attentional control) shifts the visibility curve down-
ward, resulting in apparent negative effects of visibility at many
contrasts (being significantly negative at the highest contrast;
t(15)  2.19, p  0.045, Cohen’s d  0.55). Therefore, this
analysis suggests that the negative effects of visibility reported
previously (Brascamp et al., 2010),measured at a contrast of 0.62,
are potentially due to the lack of a stringent control of attention.
Descriptive model fitting
To investigate whether our measured gain functions can be de-
scribed by pure contrast-gain and response-gain functions, we
determined whether single parameter modulations from a base-
line CRF could fit our data (Ling and Carrasco, 2006). We fitted
both response gain and contrast gain models to the visibility and
attention AI data with one free parameter (see Materials and
Methods). To control for correlations between response-gain
and contrast-gain models, we computed Z-transformed partial
correlations (Movshon et al., 1985; Smith et al., 2005) (see Mate-
rials andMethods for details). The resulting test-statistics, Zc and
Zr, refer to the z-transformedpartial correlations for the contrast-
gain and response-gain fit, respectively. A Z of zero means that
there is no correlation between the data and themodel.We found
that the attention data was best fit with a response-gain model
(for the low SF data: Zr  2.26, p  0.012, one-tailed, whereas
Zc0.162, p 0.56; Fig. 2F). Conversely, visibility was better
fit with a contrast gain model (Zr1.09, p 0.86, Zc 1.67,
p  0.047; Fig. 2F). These results are further supported when the
Z-values are converted back into r-values (data not shown). Finally,
usingmore lenient trial selectioncriteriaonRSVPperformance(e.g.,
correctnumberof items2or3)didnot change these results (Fig.
2F, different symbol sizes), showing that our results are not due to
the specific trial selection criterion thatweused.ThehighSFdata are
similar to the low SF data (Fig. 2F) and the same conclusions will be
reached. These data show that gain functions of attention and con-
sciousness can be modeled by changes of single parameters of the
baseline response function and can be approximated by pure re-
sponse and contrast gain functions, respectively.
Model comparisons with the BIC
The previous analysis showed that descriptive models of contrast
gain and response gain can describe our data, but to provide a
contrast
Δ 
AI
 d
ur
at
io
n 
(s)
−0.5
−0.25
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Dual task
No dual task
FS hgiHFS woL
Δ 
AI
 d
ur
at
io
n 
(s)
.03 .06 .13 .25 .5 1
contrast
.03 .06 .13 .25 .5 1
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Figure 3. Gain functions for visibility in conditions without attention (filled symbols) and
those with attention (open symbols). Left, In low SF conditions, the presence of attention in
addition to visibility does not appear to alter the gain function. Right, In the high SF condition,
the addition of attention shortens the afterimage durations overall, pushing theAI measure
below zero (significantly so at inducer contrasts of 100%). Note that the y-axes have different
scales in the left and right panel. Error bars indicate SEM over participants.
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better mechanistic account, we constructed several computa-
tional models based on a normalization framework to investigate
which model architecture could best explain our data.
In a normalization framework, the response to a target stim-
ulus in one eye is divided by the activity of a normalization pool
(Heeger, 1992; Reynolds and Heeger, 2009; Carandini and
Heeger, 2011). This normalization pool combines the neural ac-
tivity in response to both the target stimulus and the competing
stimulus in the other eye (Baker andMeese, 2007; Ling and Blake,
2012). In this framework, an interocular mask will result in a
contrast-gain effect.
Using a normalization framework, the modeled influence of
attention on perception could result in both response gain and
contrast gain effects (Reynolds andHeeger, 2009; Ling and Blake,
2012). However, an increase in attention cannot produce a neg-
ative effect on afterimage duration in this model. To explain a
negative effect of attention, other researchers have proposed a
two-level process (Suzuki and Grabowecky, 2003; Wede and
Francis, 2007; Brascamp et al., 2010; van Boxtel et al., 2010b). The
first level (L1) is sensitive to the particular configuration of light
and dark patches; that is, it is contrast-polarity sensitive. After a
prolonged adaptation period, the polarity sensitivity of this level
causes it to produce a negative afterimage when a blank screen is
shown. This process is generally assumed to underlie afterimages.
On top of this first level, the two-stage model assumes that the out-
put of L1 is the input of a second level. This second level is polarity
insensitive,meaning that it is sensitive to the contrast of the stimulus
independently of the light/dark arrangement of luminance. A
change in activity at this level will change the perceived contrast of
the stimulus, but will not generate an afterimage when no input is
received.Here,we implement this conceptual two-levelmodel intoa
simple computational model, incorporating the idea of response
normalization (Heeger, 1992; Reynolds and Heeger, 2009; Caran-
dini and Heeger, 2011) at both stages.
Wemodeled each of the two levels, L1 and L2, by a normaliza-
tion process (see Materials and Methods; Fig. 4A) in which the
output response of each level was modeled as follows:
L1,2C, a, CCFS	 
aCn
aCn  aCCFS
n  C50
n (23)
At L1,C is the contrast of the inducer and, at L2,C is the output of
L1. The parameter a is the influence of attention (where a  1
means unattended and a  1 means attended). Here, we let at-
tention influence both the processing of the afterimage inducer
and the CFS stimulus because our design mainly manipulated
spatial attention (in fact, feature-based attention would be diffi-
cult to deploy in our stimuli because the orientation and contrast
was randomized over trials). CCFS is the contrast of the mask and
C50 is the contrast at which half-maximum response is reached.
Theparametern controls the steepness of the curves.Note thatmost
of the models that we considered incorporate only contrast-gain
changes because our stimuliwere relatively small comparedwith the
presumed size of the attentional window (Reynolds and Heeger,
2009). SeeMaterials andMethods for full model descriptions.
To incorporate the differences between L1 and L2 in terms of
their sensitivity to contrast polarity, the effects of adaptationwere
modeled differently in both levels. In L1, adaptation is polarity
sensitive, so, after adaptation, when presented with a blank
screen, unadapted neurons will bemore active then adapted neu-
rons, resulting in a negative afterimage. Therefore, we modeled
the activity of L1 after adaptation as equal to the activity of the
neurons sensitive to the opposite polarity before adaptation (as
explained in the Materials and Methods). Adaptation at L2 was
incorporated by assuming that L2 was less sensitive to the input
from L1 after adaptation (i.e., similar to threshold elevation) by
an amount proportional to its activity before adaptation (see
Eq. 8 and 9 in the Materials and Methods).
Different model architectures were fitted to the data, differing
in the level at which attention and consciousness took effect (i.e.,
at L1 and/or L2; Figure 4B). As a baseline, we constructed amodel
that included monocular normalization only, but no influences
of attention or consciousness through interocular suppression
(the “monocular normalization-only” (N)model). Othermodels
were an “attention-first” model in which attentional modulated
L1 whereas consciousness modulated L2; a “consciousness-first”
model in which consciousness modulated L1 and attention modu-
lated L2; and a “full model” in which both attention and conscious-
ness could influence L1 and L2. We also included two models in
whichattentionwas explicitlymodeled as a response gain.Themod-
els were compared using the BIC (Schwarz, 1978), whichweighs the
maximum value of the likelihood function against the number of
freeparameters in themodel.A lowBICispreferred.Allmodelswere
comparedwith theNmodel because thismodel did not incorporate
the effects of our attention and visibility manipulations and there-
fore serves as a good baseline.Models were fit concurrently on both
the afterimage durations (Fig. 2A,C) and attention and conscious-
ness effects (Fig. 2B,D)with equalweights. Fittedmodel parameters
for the low SF data are given in Table 1.
The BIC analysis revealed that the consciousness-first model
best fits the data for low SF (Fig. 4C) and high SF (Fig. 4G) data.
The attention-firstmodel did not fit the data verywell because the
direction of modulation of attention and consciousness were al-
ways in the samedirection. The fullmodel fitted the data verywell
(Fig. 4D,H), but did not obtain a very low BIC score because of
the added complexity of the model. Interestingly, the optimal fit
parameters (Table 1) of the full model showed that the CFS pa-
rameter was 0.61 at L1, and 0.05 at L2, suggesting that CFS should
only influence L1. In addition, it showed that attentionwas 2.2 atL1
(where 1meansno attention),whereas itwas 100 atL2, showing that
attention mostly influenced L2. Both of these findings conform the
simpler model architecture of the consciousness-first model, sug-
gesting that, indeed, the consciousness-first model is an optimal
model. The models with attention modeled as a response gain, la-
beledCr andAr inFigure 4,C,D,G, andH, producedworse fits than
the respectivemodelswith attentionmodeled as a contrast-gain (i.e.,
modelsCandA).Of these two, theCrmodelwas significantlybetter,
but it was unable to show strong increases of attentional effects at
medium contrasts and it did not evidence a plateau effect at high
contrasts, thus its underperformance relative to the consciousness-
first (C) model (BIC 3.84 between the two models). Posterior
model comparisons (Wasserman, 2000) showed that the conscious-
ness-first (C) model has a posterior probability of 0.83 of being the
correct model, whereas the second-best model was the Cr model
with a posterior probability of 0.12.
ThesesameanalyseswerealsoperformedforthehighSFdata,result-
ing in the same conclusions (Fig. 4G–J), with the consciousness-first
model fitting the data the best (BIC 5.45 between the C and
Crmodel).Posteriormodel comparisons showedthat theC-modelhas
a posterior probability of 0.93 of being the correct model,
whereas the second-bestmodel was the Crmodel with a posterior
probability of 0.06.
Thismodel comparison revealed that our data are best explained
bya two-levelnormalizationmodel inwhichconsciousnessoperates
at the first level, whereas attention operates at the second level.
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Influence of the mask
Onepotential explanation of our visibility findings is that they are
due to the presence/absence of the mask, not the visibility/invis-
ibility of the inducer. Past research has shown that the presence/
absence of the mask does not fully determine the strength of the
aftereffects (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005; Blake et al., 2006; van
Boxtel et al., 2010b), but the mask may have an influence,
through contrast adaptation, at low inducer SFs (Brascamp et al.,
2010). To test for the influence of the mask, we compared linear
mixed models through likelihood ratio tests (Bates et al., 2014).
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Afterimage duration was taken as the dependent variable and
fixed effects were the inducer contrast, the CFS presence/absence,
and the visibility (as indicated by the participants button presses).
Random intercepts per participant were included. The unre-
stricted model included all fixed effects and their interactions,
which we compared with restricted models that excluded either
the factor CFS (and its interaction terms) or visibility (and its
interaction terms). For low SF conditions, visibility had a signif-
icant effect (	(4)
2  33.30, p 0.0001), and CFS had a significant
effect (	(4)
2  9.94, p 0.041). For the high SF condition, visibil-
ity had a significant effect (	(4)
2  353.87, p  0.0001), but CFS
did not (	(4)
2  2.57, p  0.63). The model with the visibility
influence (but not CFS) had a lower BIC than the model with the
CFS influence (but not visibility): BIC  23.36 for low SF and
BIC  351.31 for high SF). Therefore, the main influence ap-
pears to be visibility, but CFS does influence afterimage durations
for low SF inducers.
Discussion
Modulations of CRFs are one of the most valuable descriptors of
visual function (Reynolds and Heeger, 2009; Carrasco, 2011),
allowing one to investigate the computational mechanisms un-
derlying visual processing (Reynolds and Heeger, 2009). We
measured the modulations of afterimage duration CRFs, or gain
functions, induced by attention and consciousness.We show that
attention and consciousness can have opposite effects on after-
image durations and, more importantly, that attention displays a
response gain function, whereas consciousness displays a con-
trast gain function (which is possibly stronger for low SFs). These
results show that attention and consciousness, arguably the two
most important cognitive functions, operate through different
underlying mechanisms.
These results are consistent with previous demonstrations of a
dissociation between attention and consciousness (Kentridge et
al., 2004; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2008; Brascamp et al., 2010;
van Boxtel et al., 2010b; Watanabe et al., 2011), but additionally
provide an explanation of the processes that underlie this disso-
ciation. Showing such clear dissociations between attention and
consciousness is not always possible. For example, using a
different experimental setup and parameters, attention pro-
duces contrast-gain functions at a behavioral level (Reynolds and
Heeger, 2009; Herrmann et al., 2010), just like consciousness
often does. Attention and consciousness would then appear to
work synergistically. However, even though attention and con-
sciousness show synergistic effects in those experiments, our
findings suggest their computational underpinnings can be dis-
sociated using the current paradigm.
Through extensive model comparisons, we show that the
dissociation is best explained by a hierarchical two-level normal-
izationmodel, in which attention acts on a late contrast-polarity-
insensitive level, whereas consciousnessmanipulations, bymeans
of interocular suppression, act on an early contrast-polarity-
sensitive level. Because contrast-polarity sensitivity is predomi-
nantly found subcortically in LGN and in layer 4 in V1 (Hubel
and Wiesel, 1968; Levitt et al., 2001), our findings are consistent
with the idea that interocular suppression operates at early visual
stages (Blake, 1989; Tong et al., 2006), potentially as early as LGN
orV1 (Sengpiel et al., 1998; Polonsky et al., 2000;Meese andHess,
2004; Watanabe et al., 2004; Haynes et al., 2005; Li et al., 2005;
Bahrami et al., 2008; Yuval-Greenberg and Heeger, 2013). How-
ever, other research suggests that interocular masking at LGN or
V1 is weak or nonexistent (Lehky and Maunsell, 1996; Leopold
and Logothetis, 1996; Macknik and Martinez-Conde, 2004; Ke-
liris et al., 2010;Watanabe et al., 2011).Our results cannot resolve
this issue because, although we show sensitivity to contrast po-
larity, cells with such sensitivity (Zhou et al., 2000), as well as
(rare) ocularly biased cells (Zeki, 1978; Hubel and Livingstone,
1987), exist in both striate and extrastriate visual areas. However,
most results (including ours) are consistent with neurophysio-
logical (Leopold and Logothetis, 1996) and computational (Free-
man, 2005) findings that suggest that interocular inhibition at
early stages is small and noisy and complete perceptual suppres-
sion builds up over consecutive stages in the visual hierarchy.
Our data further show that attention mainly operates on a
higher contrast-polarity-insensitive level. This is largely consis-
tent with the idea that attention allows for vision with scrutiny
through top-downmodulation of neural activity (Hochstein and
Ahissar, 2002; Buffalo et al., 2010), acting more strongly higher
up in the visual hierarchy (Rainer et al., 1998).
Different from our two-stage model, two recent models pro-
posed that attention operates at the same level as interocular
suppression (Ling and Blake, 2012; Li et al., 2015). Although
seemingly at odds, this approach is not inconsistent with ours.
For example, in Li et al. (2015), attention is binocular, consistent
with the higher-level (second) stage in our model. Attention then
influences (presumably through feedback) interocular competition.
Importantly, the attentional influences on interocular suppression
were strong only when competing stimuli were large, but not when
they were small (Ling and Blake, 2012; Li et al., 2015). Because our
stimuli were small, this may have obviated the need to model the
first-level attentional influences for our experiments.
Other data suggest that attention is not merely a modulator of,
but actually a prerequisite for binocular rivalry (Zhang et al., 2011;
Brascamp and Blake, 2012). Although attention generally influ-
ences binocular rivalry minimally (Meng and Tong, 2004; van Ee
et al., 2005), the finding that binocular rivalry may require atten-
tion could suggest that there exists an interaction between our
attention manipulation and our consciousness manipulation
(see also Ling and Blake, 2012; and our Fig. 3), thus potentially
making them not completely independent in our experimental
design. Although this situation is not ideal, the existence of such
an interaction means that, if we were able to better separate at-
tention and consciousness, then the results would probably be
still clearer.
Interestingly, whereas attentionmay be required for binocular
rivalry, conscious awareness of the visual conflict is not (Bras-
camp et al., 2015; Zou et al., 2016). This finding supports the
proposed dissociation of attention and consciousness. It must be
Table 1. Model fit for the free parameters for the four models
Monocular
normalization
only model
Attention-first
model
Consciousness-first
model
Full
model
n 0.920 0.920 1.567 1.785
C50 1 1 0.276 0.267
O 0.102 0.102 0.567 0.472
s 8.982 8.962 6.686 6.865
m 0 0 0.671 0.665
A1
a 1 2.024
A2
a 7.650 99.999
Ccfs1
b 0.610
Ccfs2
b 0.050
aAttention was set to 1 in the low-attention conditions, the reported value is the fit parameter for the attended
high-attention condition.
bCcfs was fixed to 0 or 1 when the CFS was absent or present in most models; however, it was free to vary in the
present condition in the full model; these values are reported here. Subscripts 1 and 2 refer to level 1 and level 2.
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mentioned that recent neurophysiological measurements suggest
that binocular rivalry may occur in the absence of both attention
and consciousness (Xu et al., 2016), meaning that the above con-
cerns about our paradigm are moot.
From a computational perspective, it is interesting that the best-
performing consciousness-first model only included contrast-gain
computations, even outperforming models that explicitly in-
cluded response-gains for attention. It nevertheless produced a
response gain for attention because the modeled contrast-
response function at the second level was not yet at saturation at
high contrasts, so a contrast-gain change induced by attention
translated into increased activity, even at high contrasts. Argu-
ably, this unsaturated response is not consistent with neurophys-
iological data. However, this “true” contrast response behavior of
a neuron cannot bemeasured in the brain. One can onlymeasure
the contrast response curve at a certain level determined by the
contrast-dependent input from preceding neuronal levels. In
other words, the output of level X is dependent on the contrast-
dependent input it receives from level X  1. This “observed”
contrast-response curve is the one that is measured in neuro-
physiological experiments. Consistent with these observations,
our model also shows response saturation of the contrast-
response function of L2 given the input of L1 (Fig. 4E). In addition
to this effect, the response gain is then further strengthened by
adaptation (which is effectively a response gain change) that is
dependent on the attention-modulated activity.
Our modeling suggests that both the effects of attention and
consciousness on afterimage duration are the result of a signal
enhancement at the neuronal level. It has been suggested that
these effects could therefore operate through identical or similar
mechanisms (Brascamp et al., 2010; Blake et al., 2014), thus im-
plying a weak separation between attention and consciousness.
This interpretation, however, was based onmeasurements at just
a single inducer contrast. Here, we havemeasured the entire con-
trast response curve and analyzed the results with different two-
levelmodels. Our analysis reveals that, even though attention and
consciousness both cause increases in activity, they achieve that
through processes that give rise to different (gain) functions and
by influencing different levels within the visual processing hier-
archy.Our overall set of findings is not consistent with alternative
interpretations based on the assumption that the effects of sup-
pression are purely due to decreasing attention to a stimulus that
is rendered invisible (Blake et al., 2014; Li et al., 2015).
A separate concern is that the effects that we attribute to con-
sciousness may instead be due to a difference in contrast adapta-
tion when the interocularmask is present versus when it is absent
(i.e., it is stimulus dependent) and not due to changes in con-
scious perception per se (Cohen et al., 2012). Consistentwith past
findings (Brascamp et al., 2010), we find that, for low SF stimuli,
there is an influence of the mask, but not for high SF stimuli. It is
thus worthwhile to investigate and control for this potential influ-
ence (Brascamp et al., 2010;Watanabe et al., 2011; Yuval-Greenberg
andHeeger, 2013). However, conscious visibility had a significantly
stronger effect in our data, consistent with previous indications that
aftereffect strength is largely determined by the conscious percept
and that the presence/absence of themask is not (fully) determining
the strengthof the aftereffects (Tsuchiya andKoch, 2005;Blake et al.,
2006; van Boxtel et al., 2010b).
It is currently not possible to determine how general our find-
ings are. However, apart from afterimages, attention can decrease
perception or performance in motion-induced blindness (Geng
et al., 2007; Scho¨lvinck and Rees, 2009) and the motion afteref-
fect (Murd and Bachmann, 2011), for Troxler/peripheral fad-
ing (Lou, 1999; DeWeerd et al., 2006), visual memory (Voss and
Paller, 2009), SF (Yeshurun and Carrasco, 1998), the attentional
blink (Olivers andNieuwenhuis, 2005), and visual search (Smilek
et al., 2006). These findings suggest that our conclusions may be
valid beyond the context of afterimages.
In conclusion, our results indicate that signal enhancement
functions differently through attention and consciousness. Be-
cause it is easy to conflate attention and consciousness effects,
future research would gain from carefully controlling parameters
that influence attention and consciousness.
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